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Voting	to	Leave:	Economic	insecurity	and	the	Brexit	vote	
	
Daphne	Halikiopoulou,	University	of	Reading	
Tim	Vlandas,	University	of	Reading	
	
Introduction	
	
The	victory	of	the	Brexit	camp	in	the	recent	UK	referendum	on	whether	to	stay	or	leave	the	
European	 Union	 (EU)	 represents	 a	 turning	 point	 in	 the	 history	 of	 European	 integration.	
Leave	won	with	51.9	per	cent	voting	to	Leave	and	48.1	per	cent	voting	to	Remain.	England	
and	 Wales	 supported	 Leave	 with	 53.4	 per	 cent	 and	 52.5	 per	 cent	 respectively,	 while	
Scotland	and	Northern	 Ireland	had	a	Remain	majority	with	62	per	cent	and	55.8	per	cent	
respectively.	 In	 England,	 London	 voted	 overwhelmingly	 to	 Remain	 but	 most	 other	 areas	
voted	to	Leave	including	the	West	Midlands	(59	per	cent),	East	Midlands	(59	per	cent)	and	
the	North	East	(58	per	cent).	Leave	made	gains	from	both	Labour	and	Conservative	voters,	
cutting	across	party	lines.		
	
In	 many	 ways	 this	 was	 a	 surprising	 result.	 While	 the	 UK	 is	 indeed	 amongst	 the	 most	
Eurosceptic	 countries	 in	 the	 EU,	 the	 consensus	 expectation	 was	 nonetheless	 for	 a	 tight	
outcome	in	favour	of	Remain:	Remain	was	the	choice	of	both	pollsters	and	bookmakers.	So	
how	may	we	explain	this	result?	This	chapter	focuses	on	the	political	economy	of	the	Brexit	
vote.	 It	 contributes	 to	 the	 debate	 on	 British	 Euroscepticism	 by	 examining	 the	 impact	 of	
economic	insecurity	on	the	Brexit	referendum	vote.	Drawing	on	research	that	has	examined	
the	 role	 of	 economic	 insecurity	 and	 labour	market	 institutions	 on	 far	 right	 party	 support	
(Halikiopoulou	 and	 Vlandas	 2016;	 Vlandas	 and	 Halikiopoulou	 2016),	 we	 explore	 the	
determinants	 of	 individual	 support	 for	 Brexit.	 Our	 focus	 is	 on	 several	 factors	 relating	 to	
economic	insecurity	that	have	all	received	significant	attention	in	broader	political	economy	
debates	 including	 income,	 occupation,	 unemployment,	 poverty	 and	 the	 level	 and	 type	 of	
education.	Our	analysis	pays	particular	attention	to	the	labour	market	position	of	individuals	
and	the	labour	market	risks	they	face	as	we	want	to	examine	whether-	and	if	so	how-	the	
risk	 of	 being	 unemployed,	 the	 risk	 of	 being	 in	 poverty	 and	 housing	 risk	 (whether	 or	 not	
individuals	 rent	 their	 accommodation)	 have	 influenced	 support	 for	 Brexit.	 We	 also	
investigate	the	impact	of	 income	level	and	source,	of	being	 in	 low	skill	occupations,	which	
compete	the	most	with	immigration,	and	of	having	studied	a	higher	education	degree	that	is	
‘protective’	(medicine	or	law).		
	
Our	 findings	 overall	 support	 the	 economic	 insecurity	 thesis.	 Our	 results	 from	 a	 logistic	
regression	 analysis	 of	 the	 British	 Election	 Study	 suggest	 that	white	 respondents,	 those	 at	
higher	risk	of	poverty,	below	the	median	income,	with	no	formal	education	are	more	likely	
to	 vote	 for	 Brexit.	 Surprisingly,	 those	 that	 self-identify	 as	 being	 at	 greater	 risk	 of	
unemployment	and	those	that	 rent	 their	accommodation	are	 less	 likely	 to	vote	 for	Brexit.	
Finally,	workers	in	routine	or	low	skill	occupations,	which	we	show	have	been	more	exposed	
to	 immigration,	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 vote	 for	 Brexit,	 while	 respondents	 that	 have	 studied	
‘protected’	disciplines	such	as	law	and	medicine	are	less	likely	to	support	Brexit.	Gender	has	
no	 effect	 but	 age	matters	 in	 the	 anticipated	way:	 older	 respondents	were	more	 likely	 to	
support	Brexit.	
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Our	 findings	 are	 consistent	with	 the	 state	 of	 the	 art	 in	 the	 emerging	 literature	 on	Brexit.	
Most	existing	studies	have	emphasised	the	role	of	income,	employment,	age	and	education	
(e.g.	Becker	et	al	2016;	Goodwin	and	Heath	2016b).	These	studies	have	also	examined	the	
previous	 voting	 preferences	 of	 Brexit	 supporters,	 assessing	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 Brexit	
support	correlates	with	a	previous	vote	for	UKIP	(ibid).	Overall,	according	to	Goodwin	and	
Heath	‘the	2016	referendum	gave	full	expression	to	deeper	divides	in	Britain	that	cut	across	
generational,	educational	and	class	lines’	(Goodwin	and	Heath	2016a).		
	
The	 chapter	 is	 structured	 as	 follows.	 We	 first	 provide	 a	 theoretical	 overview	 that	
contextualises	 party-based	 and	 public	 Euroscepticism.	 Here	 we	 juxtapose	 economic	 and	
cultural	 factors	 and	 briefly	 discuss	 the	 left-right	 dimension	 and	 nationalism	 as	 drivers	 of	
Euroscepticism.	We	proceed	with	a	focus	on	the	economy	and	public	Euroscepticism	in	the	
UK:	we	theorise	economic	insecurity,	discuss	why	it	could	potentially	lead	to	a	Leave	vote.	In	
the	next	section	we	describe	our	data	and	discuss	how	operationalize	key	factors	related	to	
economic	 insecurity	 and	 present	 our	 results.	We	 proceed	 by	 locating	 our	 findings	 in	 the	
context	of	other	 studies	on	 the	 topic,	 outlining	 the	profile	of	 the	Brexit	 voter	 in	 terms	of	
their	economic	and	cultural	background,	as	well	as	his/her	attitudes	on	various	social	issues.	
The	final	section	concludes.		
	
Party-based	and	Public	Euroscepticism	
	
Euroscepticism	 is	 a	 broad	 umbrella	 term	 that	 encompasses	 various	 types	 and	 levels	 of	
opposition	to	the	EU.	Taggart	(1998:	365)	defines	Euroscepticism	as	‘the	idea	of	contingent	
or	qualified	opposition,	as	well	as	 incorporating	outright	and	unqualified	opposition	to	the	
process	of	European	integration’.	The	different	levels	of	opposition	are	usually	captured	by	
the	hard/soft	Euroscepticism	typology.	On	the	one	hand,	the	former	refers	to	a	principled	
opposition	to	the	EU	and	the	idea	of	European	integration.	It	rejects	the	whole	EU	project	
and	 supports	 withdrawal.	 Soft	 Euroscepticism,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 is	 not	 a	 principled	
objection	 to	 European	 integration	 or	 EU	membership.	 Rather,	 opposition	 targets	 specific	
policies.	There	is,	therefore,	an	expression	of	a	qualified	opposition	to	the	EU.		
	
With	regards	to	both	political	parties	and	voters,	Euroscepticism	tends	to	be	understood	in	
terms	 of	 positions	 on	 the	 left-right	 dimension	 (Hooghe	 et	 al	 2004;	 Van	 Elsas	 and	 Van	 de	
Brug,	2015).	Parties	oppose	Europe	on	both	strategic	and	 ideological	grounds.	 In	 terms	of	
strategy,	Euroscepticism	tends	to	be	associated	with	peripheral	parties	(Taggart	1998;	Sitter	
2001;	 Halikiopoulou	 et	 al	 2012;	 De	 Vries	 and	 Edwards	 2009)	 driven	 by	 protest	 and	
incentivised	 to	 oppose	 Europe	 as	 a	 means	 of	 differentiating	 themselves	 from	 their	
mainstream	competitors.	 Fringe	parties	of	 both	 the	 right	 and	 the	 left	 are	 therefore	more	
likely	 to	be	critical	of	 the	EU	than	 their	mainstream	rivals.	The	2014	European	Parliament	
election	 results	 confirm	 this	 to	 a	 great	 extent.	 The	 intensification	 of	 political	 integration	
within	the	context	of	the	EU	economic	and	migrant	crises	has	been	accompanied	by	the	rise	
of	far	right	and-	to	a	 lesser	extent-	 far	 left	Eurosceptic	parties	across	Europe	 including	the	
French	 Front	 National	 (FN),	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 Independence	 Party	 (UKIP),	 the	 Danish	
People’s	Party	(DF),	the	Greek	Golden	Dawn	(DN)	and	Coalition	of	the	Radical	Left	(SYRIZA).			
In	 terms	 of	 ideology,	 the	 EU	 project	 is	 underpinned	 by	 a	 rationale	 that	 is	 fundamentally	
opposed	 to	 the	 core	 principles	 of	 the	 far	 left:	 a	 European	 union	 that	 favours	 neoliberal	
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policies	 and	 the	 free	market	and	as	 such	 threatens	 radical	 left	 goals	 (Hooghe	et	 al.	 2004:	
128).	 Hence,	 opposition	 to	 the	 EU	 project	 originated	 mainly	 from	 far	 left	 parties,	 which	
opposed	free	market	economics.	Far	right	Euroscepticism	on	the	other	hand	is	underpinned	
by	nationalism:	a	 justification	of	opposition	 to	EU	 integration	on	 the	basis	of	 identity	and	
national	 sovereignty.	 Following	Maastricht	 and	 the	 intensification	 of	 political	 integration,	
Euroscepticism	 became	 increasingly	 widespread	 among	 far	 right	 parties	 whose	
programmatic	agendas	emphasise	the	need	to	safeguard	national	identity	and	culture	from	
EU	erosion.		
It	is	therefore	conventional	wisdom	in	the	field	that	far	left	and	far	right	Euroscepticism	are	
two	 different	 phenomena:	 the	 former	 is	 associated	 with	 an	 opposition	 to	 neo-liberal	
economics	while	the	latter	is	seen	as	a	product	of	nationalism	(De	Vries	and	Edwards	2009).	
Other	work,	however,	has	shown	that	Eurosceptic	positions	may	be	understood	in	terms	of	
a	 cultural	 cleavage	 dimension.	 Halikiopoulou	 et	 al	 (2012),	 for	 example,	 have	 shown	 that	
both	 far	 left	 and	 far	 right	of	 Euroscepticism	are	associated	with	nationalism:	 the	 far	 right	
with	ethnic	and	cultural	nationalism	and	the	far	left	with	economic	and	civic	nationalism.		
If	 party	 based	 Euroscepticism	 is	 driven	 by	 strategic	 and	 ideological	 considerations,	 what	
drives	public	attitudes	towards	Euroscepticism?	Sørensen	(2008)	identifies	4	types	of	public	
EU	 opposition	 drivers:	 (1)	 economic,	 as	 money-based	 calculations	 are	 central	 to	 one’s	
evaluation	 of	 the	 EU;	 (2)	 sovereignty-based,	 as	 people	 tend	 to	 perceive	 increasing	 co-
operation	 as	 a	 challenge	 to	 national	 sovereignty;	 (3)	 democratic,	 as	 the	 intensification	 of	
political	 integration	 raises	questions	with	 regards	 to	 the	EU’s	 so-called	democratic	deficit;	
and	 (4)	 social	 Euroscepticism	 which	 refers	 to	 a	 disagreement	 with	 the	 EU’s	 political	
orientation.		
	
To	make	sense	of	these	categories,	existing	literature	focuses	on	societal	cleavages,	testing	
positions	 on	 left	 and	 right	 and/or	 economy	 and	 culture,	 and/or	 attitudes	 versus	 socio-
economic	 voter	 characteristics.	 Findings	 are	 often	 conflicting,	 varying	 across	 time	 and	
country.	Marks	(2004:	239)	has	referred	to	the	object	of	Euroscepticism	as	a	‘moving	target’:		
‘the	 relationship	 between	 left/right	 orientations	 and	 the	 degree	 of	 support	 for	 European	
integration	depends	on	when	one	 is	asking	 the	question’	 (2004:	239).	 Increasingly	 studies	
emphasise	 the	 importance	 of	 a	 socio-cultural	 dimension	 (Van	 der	 Brug	 and	 Van	 Spanje,	
2009;	Kriesi	 et	 al.,	 2008;	Van	Elsas	 and	Van	de	Brug,	 2015),	 linking	Euroscepticism	 less	 to	
left-right	 positions	 (Van	 der	 Eijk	 and	 Franklin,	 2004),	 and	 increasingly	 to	 public	 attitudes	
towards	 immigrants	 (De	 Vries,	 Hakhverdian	 and	 Lancee	 2013).	 However,	 this	 does	 not	
necessarily	imply	that	the	economy	is	irrelevant.	As	we	show	in	the	next	section,	there	are	
good	reasons	to	expect	the	economy	to	have	an	influence	on	public	Euroscepticism.		
	
The	Brexit	vote:	The	role	of	economic	insecurity	
	
‘Why’	and	which	UK	citizens	voted	against	Europe?	This	chapter	 focuses	on	 the	economic	
dimension	 of	 the	 Leave	 vote.	More	 specifically,	 it	 examines	 how	 and	 to	what	 extent	 this	
Eurosceptic	 vote	 may	 be	 interpreted	 in	 terms	 of	 economic	 insecurity.	 The	 connection	
between	economic	performance	and	Eurosceptic	attitudes-	mainly	seen	 in	terms	of	voting	
for	 Eurosceptic	 parties	 -	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 either:	 (1)	 a	 rejection	 of	 underperforming	
economic	policy	understood	as	a	result	of	EU	policy	implementation;	and/or	(2)	a	reaction	
of	the	losers	of	integration.		
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Economic	 insecurity	 and	 perceived	 economic	 risks	 have	 been	 shown	 to	mediate	 far	 right	
vote	 (Arzheimer	 2009;	 Halikiopoulou	 and	 Vlandas	 2016).	 We	 conceptualise	 economic	
insecurity	both	in	terms	of	unemployment	and	risk	of	unemployment,	as	well	as	the	risk	of	
being	 in	 poverty	 and	 the	 risk	 of	 uncertain	 housing	 conditions.	 A	 number	 of	 studies	 in	
political	economy	have	found	unemployment	to	impact	negatively	on	various	dimensions	of	
one’s	 welfare,	 such	 as	 well-being,	 life	 satisfaction,	 or	 other	 metrics	 (e.g.	 Jahoda	 1988;	
Gerlach	 and	 Stephan	1996).	 The	 risk	 of	 unemployment	 remains	 a	 source	of	 insecurity	 for	
those	who	return	to	work	after	a	period	of	unemployment	(Böckerman	2004).	This	in	turn	is	
expected	to	affect	political	preferences	and	is	thus	linked	to	voting	behaviour:	those	without	
a	 job	 or	 in	 precarious	 employment	 have	 differing	 policy	 preferences	 from	 those	 who	
currently	have	a	permanent	job	(Rueda	2005;	Rueda	2007;	Emmenegger	2012;	Marx	2014).		
	
In	sum,	deteriorating	economic	conditions	are	expected	to	impact	negatively	voters’	socio-
economic	positions	and/or	their	expectations.	The	economically	insecure	are	more	likely	to	
see	 themselves	 as	 the	 ‘losers’	 of	 European	 integration-	 as	 well	 as	 modernization	 more	
broadly.	This	actual	or	perceived	deprivation	 is	 likely	 to	drive	anti-EU	positions	either	as	a	
form	of	protest	vote,	as	a	punishment	of	the	establishment,	or	opposition	to	free	movement	
of	labour	and	immigrant	access	to	welfare	and	jobs.		
	
The	economically	 insecure	are	often	expected	to	be	key	constituents	of	the	populist	right,	
because	 of	 protest	 and	 anti-systemic	 attitudes,	 and	 potential	 linkages	 made	 with	
unfavourable	 out-group	 and	 authoritarian	 attitudes	 (Lubbers	 and	 Scheepers	 2002:	 134).	
There	is	also	the	issue	of	competition	with	immigrants	and	labour	market	outsiders	for	jobs,	
welfare,	and	more	broadly,	for	access	to	the	collective	goods	of	the	state	(Wimmer	1997;	de	
Koster	et	al	2012).		
	
This	chapter	tests	whether	these	hypotheses	may	also	be	applied	to	a	Eurosceptic	vote,	and	
more	specifically,	Brexit.	Our	analysis	pays	particular	attention	to	the	labour	market	position	
of	individuals	and	the	labour	market	risks	they	face	as	we	want	to	examine	whether	the	risk	
of	 being	 unemployed,	 the	 risk	 of	 being	 in	 poverty	 and	 housing	 risk	 (whether	 or	 not	 an	
individual	rents	their	accommodation)	have	influenced	support	for	Brexit.	
	
Empirical	analysis	
	
Data	
In	 order	 to	 explore	 the	 determinants	 of	 the	 Brexit	 vote,	 we	 rely	 on	 the	 6th	 wave	 of	 the	
British	 Election	 Study1	 that	 asked	 respondents	 about	 their	 voting	 intentions	 for	 the	
referendum	 before	 it	 took	 place.	 The	 question	 about	 the	 referendum	was	 as	 follows:	 “If	
there	was	a	referendum	on	Britain's	membership	of	the	European	Union’	turnout,	how	do	
you	think	you	would	vote?”2	We	create	a	dummy	variable	coded	1	if	the	respondent	chose	
Leave	and	0	otherwise	(‘don’t	knows’	are	recoded	missing).	
																																								 																				
1	Fieldhouse,	E.,	Green,	J.,	Evans,	G.,	Schmitt,	H.,	van	der	Eijk,	C.,	Mellon,	J.,	Prosser,	C.	(2016).	British	Election	
Study,	2015:	Face-to-Face	Post-Election	Survey.	UK	Data	Service.	SN:	7972,	http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-
SN-7972-1.	The	survey	includes	30,027	respondents.	
2	14,010	respondents	(46.66%)	responded	“stay	in	the	EU”,	10,357	(34.5%)	“Leave	the	EU”,	883	(2.9%)	said	
they	“would	not	vote”	and	4,775	(15.9%)	answered	“Don’t	Know”	(weights	applied).	
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We	create	a	female	dummy	variable	to	capture	the	gender	of	the	respondent	and	a	dummy	
variable	that	captures	whether	the	respondent	answered	‘white’	to	the	ethnicity	question	in	
the	 survey.	 To	measure	 the	 impact	 of	 age	 of	 the	 respondent,	we	 create	 two	 variables:	 a	
‘young’	dummy	variable	coded	1	if	respondent	is	under	25	and	0	otherwise;	and	an	‘elderly’	
dummy	 variable	 coded	 1	 if	 respondent	 is	 above	 65	 and	 0	 otherwise.	 As	 discussed	 in	 the	
previous	 section,	 young	 people	 are	 typically	 less	 Eurosceptic	 and	 the	 elderly	 are	 typically	
more	Eurosceptic.		
	
The	survey	also	asks	respondents	about	their	gross	household	income.	Rather	than	including	
all	possible	categories	from	under	5,000	to	above	150,000	pounds	per	year,	we	use	a	cut-off	
point.	 In	most	political	economy	models,	 the	crucial	 factor	 is	 the	position	of	an	 individual	
relative	to	the	median	 income	so	we	create	a	variable	 ‘above	median	 income’.	Given	that	
the	median	household	disposable	income	in	the	UK	for	2014/15	was	£25,600,3	we	code	all	
respondents	with	household	income	above	£25,000	as	being	above	median.		
	
In	addition,	we	look	at	the	role	of	education,	which	 is	meant	to	constitute	a	clear	dividing	
line	between	the	losers	and	winners	of	European	integration.	The	absolute	losers	are	likely	
to	be	those	with	no	education	so	we	create	a	dummy	that	takes	value	1	if	respondents	have	
no	 formal	 qualification.	 Among	 those	 that	 have	 undertaken	 higher	 education,	 the	 survey	
asks	 them	what	 subject	 they	 have	 studied.	 This	 provides	 an	 opportunity	 to	 test	whether	
respondents	that	have	studied	different	subjects	feel	differently	about	Brexit.	In	particular,	
we	hypothesise	 that	 respondents	 that	studied	medicine	or	 law	are	more	 likely	 to	want	 to	
remain	because	 these	 subject	areas	 lead	 to	 jobs	 that	may	be	more	 ‘closed	off’	 to	 foreign	
competition	than	jobs	building	on	education	in	the	humanities,	natural	and	social	sciences.	
	
Next,	 we	 want	 to	 test	 the	 effect	 of	 various	 risks	 on	 support	 for	 leaving.	 The	 first	 risk	 is	
whether	the	respondent	is	at	high	risk	of	poverty,	understood	as	being	“fairly	likely”	or	“very	
likely”	 (coded	 1,	 0	 otherwise)	 to	 have	 experienced	 times	when	 the	 respondent	 does	 not	
have	 enough	money	 to	 cover	 day	 to	 day	 living	 costs	 during	 the	 next	 12	months.	 To	 the	
extent	that	those	that	are	at	greater	risk	of	poverty	are	more	dissatisfied	with	the	system,	
they	may	be	more	likely	to	vote	for	Brexit.	On	the	contrary,	if	they	believe	forecasts	about	
the	economy	they	should	be	less	likely	to	vote	to	leave.	
	
The	second	risk	that	we	wish	to	capture	is	unemployment	risk.	We	create	a	dummy	variable	
that	takes	a	value	1	if	the	respondent	answers	that	they	are	fairly	or	very	likely	to	be	out	of	
work	 in	 the	 next	 12	 months,	 and	 0	 otherwise.	 Again,	 one	 could	 expect	 that	 more	
economically	insecure	respondents	would	be	more	Eurosceptic	and	hence	be	more	likely	to	
support	 Brexit,	 or	 if	 these	 respondents	 are	more	 concerned	 about	 the	 effect	 that	 Brexit	
would	have	on	the	economy	and	in	turn	on	the	risk	of	becoming	unemployed,	they	may	be	
less	likely	to	support	Brexit	given	their	greater	exposure	to	unemployment.	
	
The	 third	 risk	 concerns	 housing	 insecurity.	 We	 create	 a	 variable	 that	 is	 coded	 1	 if	
respondents	 are	 renting	 and	 0	 otherwise.	 Here	 we	 expect	 individuals	 that	 experience	
																																								 																				
3	Accessed	at:	
http://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/personalandhouseholdfinances/incomeandwealth/b
ulletins/nowcastinghouseholdincomeintheuk/2015-10-28	
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greater	 housing	 insecurity	 to	 be	 more	 supportive	 of	 Brexit	 both	 because	 they	 are	 more	
economically	 insecure	and	because	they	might	 link	European	 integration	with	 immigration	
and	‘pressures’	on	housing	(note	that	this	does	not	require	the	link	to	be	correct,	merely	the	
respondent	to	hold	such	views).	
	
The	fourth	risk	variable	captures	income	insecurity	and	reliance	on	state	benefits.	We	create	
a	 variables	 that	 takes	 value	 1	 if	 the	 main	 income	 of	 the	 respondent	 comes	 from	
employment	and	0	 if	 it	 comes	 from	other	 sources	 including	benefits.	 This	 variable	will	 be	
negatively	related	to	Brexit	if	greater	income	security	and	lower	reliance	on	benefits	lowers	
support	for	Brexit.	
	
Finally,	we	 investigate	 the	 impact	of	different	 labour	market	occupations.	The	survey	asks	
respondents	whether	 they	are	 ‘employers	 in	 large	organisations	and	 in	higher	managerial	
positions’,	 ‘higher	 professional	 occupations’,	 ‘lower	 professional	 and	 managerial	
occupations	 and	 higher	 supervisory’,	 ‘employers	 in	 small	 organisations	 and	 own	 account	
workers’,	 ‘intermediate	occupations’,	 ‘lower	supervisory	and	technical	occupations’,	 ‘semi-
routine	occupations	or	 routine	occupations’.	 I	 create	 a	dummy	variable	 if	 the	 respondent	
chooses	one	of	 the	 last	 three	occupations	because	all	 three	are	 routine	and/or	 low	skills.	
Workers	with	 lower	and	more	routine	skills	are	more	 insecure	as	 they	can	be	more	easily	
replaced	 by	 employers	 and	 also	 tend	 to	 have	 lower	 income	 potential	 and	 higher	
unemployment	risk.	In	addition,	they	were	the	most	likely	to	compete	in	the	labour	market	
with	low	skill	immigrants.	
	
Results	from	Logistic	analysis	on	one	independent	variable	at	a	time	
	
Table	 1	 reports	 the	 results	 for	 a	 series	 of	 models	 where	 each	 independent	 variable	 is	
included	on	its	own.	For	ease	of	interpretation	it	reports	the	predicted	probability	of	voting	
leave	when	the	dummy	variable	is	1	and	when	it	is	0.	Where	the	95%	confidence	interval	of	
the	predicted	probability	for	different	values	of	the	variable	overlap	(last	two	columns)	the	
variable	does	not	have	a	statistically	significant	effect.		
	
The	 predicted	 probabilities	 for	 male	 and	 female	 respondents	 are	 very	 similar	 and	 not	
statistically	 different:	 men	 are	 therefore	 not	 more	 likely	 to	 support	 Brexit	 than	 women.	
White	respondents	have	a	40%	probability	of	preferring	to	leave	compared	to	31%	for	non-
white	 respondents	 (all	 probabilities	 in	 the	 discussion	 are	 rounded),	 elderly	 respondents	
have	a	50%	predicted	probability	of	preferring	 leave	compared	to	non-elderly	whereas	for	
the	young	it	 is	18%	(compared	to	42%	for	non-young	respondents).	This	 is	consistent	with	
previous	findings	that	show	older	white	 individuals	as	being	more	supportive	of	pro-Brexit	
parties	such	as	UKIP	(Goodwin	and	Heath	2016b).	
	
In	contrast	to	accounts	that	downplay	the	role	of	material	factors,	we	find	that	they	matter	
significantly.	First,	respondents	above	the	median	income	have	a	33%	predicted	probability	
of	 supporting	Brexit	 compared	 to	47%	 for	 those	below	median.	Having	a	 lower	 income	 is	
associated	with	 greater	 support	 for	 Brexit.	 Second,	 those	with	 no	 formal	 education	 have	
predicted	probabilities	that	are	almost	twice	as	large	(65%)	as	those	with	formal	education	
(38%).	This	confirms	the	link	between	low	education	and	Euroscepticism.	Third,	the	effect	of	
the	discipline	among	those	with	higher	education	qualifications	is	striking:	respondents	that	
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have	 studied	 law	and	medicine,	disciplines	 that	 lead	 to	 jobs	which	may	be	more	 shielded	
from	 immigration,	 have	 a	 29%	 predicted	 probability	 compared	 to	 40%	 for	 other	
respondents	of	supporting	Brexit.	Fourth,	individuals	in	low	or	routine	occupations	also	have	
much	higher	 predicted	probabilities	 (55%	 versus	 37%)	 to	 vote	 Leave.	 Being	 in	 a	 low-	 skill	
occupation	 is	 indeed	 associated	with	 greater	 support	 for	 Brexit.	 Finally,	 respondents	 that	
derive	 their	 main	 earnings	 from	 employment	 have	 lower	 predicted	 probabilities	 of	
supporting	 Brexit	 (35%	 versus	 41%).	While	 the	 risk	 of	 poverty	 does	 seem	 to	matter,	 the	
effect	 is	 small	 (39%	 versus	 42%).	 More	 surprisingly,	 a	 greater	 risk	 of	 unemployment	 is	
actually	 associated	 with	 a	 lower	 support	 for	 Brexit:	 respondents	 facing	 high	 risks	 of	
unemployment	 have	 a	 lower	 predicted	 probability	 (36%)	 of	 choosing	 Leave	 compared	 to	
other	 respondents	 (41%).	 This	 is	 consistent	 with	 the	 notion	 that	 those	 facing	 high	
unemployment	risks	may	have	been	more	receptive	of	Remain	arguments	emphasising	the	
potential	adverse	impact	of	Brexit	on	the	economy.	Similarly,	renting	one’s	accommodation	
has	 the	 opposite	 effect	 to	 the	 one	 we	 would	 expect:	 respondents	 who	 rent	 their	
accommodation	have	 lower	predicted	probability	of	supporting	 leave	(35%	versus	41%).	 It	
may	 be	 that	 respondents	 who	 rent	 are	more	 concerned	 about	 the	 detrimental	 effect	 of	
Brexit	or	 that	this	 is	capturing	confounding	factors	such	as	age.	 In	order	to	be	certain,	we	
need	to	test	for	all	factors	simultaneously.	
	
Table	1:	Logistic	regression	analysis	of	one	independent	variable	at	a	time	
	
	Variable	 Respondent	
Predicted	
probability	
95%	 confidence	
interval	
Gender	 Male	 39.78%	 38.95%	 40.60%	
	
Female	 39.80%	 38.94%	 40.66%	
Ethnicity	 Non-white	 30.94%	 28.55%	 33.32%	
	
White	 40.32%	 39.70%	 40.93%	
Elderly	(65+)	 Not	elderly	 36.76%	 36.09%	 37.43%	
	
Elderly	 50.08%	 48.79%	 51.35%	
Young	(18-24)	 Not	young	 42.21%	 41.57%	 42.84%	
		 Young	 17.79%	 16.24%	 19.34%	
Income	 Not	above	median	 46.58%	 45.50%	 47.66%	
	
Above	median	 33.18%	 32.31%	 34.04%	
Risk	of	poverty	 Not	high	 38.93%	 38.24%	 39.61%	
	
High		 42.43%	 41.21%	 43.64%	
Risk	of	
unemployment	 Not	high	 40.51%	 39.86%	 41.16%	
		 High		 35.82%	 34.32%	 37.30%	
Education	 Formal	education	 37.93%	 37.32%	 38.55%	
	
No	formal	education	 64.75%	 62.54%	 66.97%	
Higher	education	
discipline	 Not	protected	 40.03%	 39.43%	 40.63%	
		 ‘Protected’	discipline	 28.72%	 24.96%	 32.48%	
Housing	 Not	rent	 40.86%	 40.19%	 41.52%	
	
Rent	 35.05%	 33.70%	 36.41%	
Earnings	from	
employment	 No	 40.55%	 39.91%	 41.18%	
	
Yes	 3.46%	 32.97%	 36.22%	
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Occupations	 Others	 37.49%	 36.86%	 38.13%	
		
Lower/routine	
occupations	 54.89%	 53.22%	 56.56%	
Note:	each	row	reports	 the	predicted	probability	of	a	dichotomous	variable	 for	 its	2	values	using	a	
logistic	 analysis	 regressing	 a	 dichotomous	 variable	 ‘voting	 leave’	 on	 that	 variable	 with	 robust	
standard	errors.	
	
Results	from	logistic	analysis	on	several	independent	variables	
	
Figure	1	reports	the	results	of	different	models	that	test	the	effects	of	several	factors	jointly.	
It	plots	semi-standardised	coefficients	–	i.e.	coefficients	have	been	rescaled	by	the	standard	
deviation	 of	 the	 variable	 in	 the	 data.	 A	 positive	 coefficient	 suggests	 the	 factor	 under	
consideration	 increases	 the	 probability	 of	 the	 respondent	 supporting	 Brexit.	 For	 each	
variable,	 the	 figure	 also	 displays	 the	 95%	 confidence	 interval,	which	 is	 shown	by	 the	 line	
around	 the	point	estimate:	when	 it	 intersects	 the	0-line,	 the	 coefficient	 is	not	 statistically	
different	from	0	and	we	conclude	that	the	factor	is	not	associated	with	support	for	Brexit.	
	
As	was	the	case	before,	gender	is	not	statistically	significant,	but	this	is	now	also	the	case	for	
the	variable	capturing	whether	the	respondent	derives	his/her	earnings	from	employment.	
The	young	are	much	 less	 likely	 to	support	Brexit	while	 the	opposite	 is	 true	 for	 the	elderly	
(relative	to	middle	aged	respondents).	The	other	results	are	the	same	as	before	but	running	
the	logistic	regression	with	all	the	independent	variables	together	allows	us	to	compare	the	
magnitude	of	the	effects.	This	reveals	that	age	is	a	strong	predictor	of	voting	leave	and	that	
the	effect	is	reduced	as	more	variables	are	included.	Next,	being	below	the	median	income,	
having	no	 formal	education,	and	being	 in	 low	or	 routine	occupations	also	have	very	 large	
significant	effects	on	voting	leave.	
	
These	 findings	 are	 consistent	 with	 the	 fact	 that	 immigration	 from	 EU	 countries	 was	
particularly	 acute	 for	 certain	 occupations.	 Thus	 for	 instance,	 ONS	 data4	 suggest	 that	
between	 2010	 and	 2014,	 164,000	 immigrants	 with	 a	 professional	 or	 managerial	
occupational	 background	 immigrated	 to	 the	 UK	 from	 the	 EU,	 while	 169,000	 immigrated	
from	outside	 the	EU.	 In	other	words,	 these	occupations	are	under	 similar	 ‘pressure’	 from	
non-EU	and	EU	countries.	By	contrast,	a	much	larger	-	277,000	–	number	of	immigrants	with	
a	manual	and	clerical	occupational	background	came	from	EU,	whereas	only	64,000	came	
from	non-EU	countries.	As	a	 result,	differences	 in	 support	 for	Brexit	between	occupations	
may	reflect	different	degrees	of	exposure	to	immigration	from	the	EU.	
	
One	way	to	visualise	the	practical	implications	of	these	results	is	to	calculate	the	predicted	
probabilities	of	voting	leave	for	two	hypothetical	individuals.	A	white	male	between	25	and	
65	years	old,	with	no	formal	education,	deriving	most	of	his	earnings	from	employment	in	a	
lower	or	routine	occupation,	renting	his	house,	and	reporting	a	high	risk	of	unemployment	
and	 poverty	 would	 have	 a	 66%	 probability	 of	 supporting	 Brexit.	 Contrast	 this	 with	 an	
individual	that	has	the	same	characteristics	in	all	respects	except	that	he	has	at	least	some	
formal	education,	is	not	at	high	risk	of	poverty	or	unemployment,	nor	in	a	lower	or	routine	
																																								 																				
4	Long-Term	International	Migration,	estimates	from	the	International	Passenger	Survey	-Annual	data.	Source:	
Office	for	National	Statistics	(ONS).	
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occupation,	and	has	studied	a	‘protected	discipline’:	this	individual	would	have	a	predicted	
probability	of	only	25%	of	supporting	Brexit.	
Figure	1:	material	determinants	of	voting	leave	
	
Note:	Robust	standard	errors	clustered	by	country.	Effects	are	rescaled	by	the	standard	
deviations	of	the	predictors.	
	
Discussion	
	
Our	 findings	with	 regards	 to	economic	 insecurity	 are	 consistent	with	 the	 findings	of	most	
existing	studies	on	Brexit.	Focusing	on	the	socio-economic	characteristics	of	the	Brexit	vote,	
Becker	 et	 al	 (2016)	 emphasise	 the	 importance	 of	 variables	 “not	 malleable	 to	 political	
choices”,	 including	 education,	 industry	 structure	 and	 demography	 (2016:2).	 They	 further	
argue	that	“policy	choices	related	to	pressure	from	immigration,	fiscal	cuts	and	the	housing	
market	 are	 linked	 to	 a	 higher	 Vote	 Leave	 share	 especially	 when	 socio-economic	
fundamentals	are	‘weak’	(low	incomes,	high	unemployment),	and	when	the	local	population	
is	 less	able	to	adapt	to	adverse	shocks	(due	to	 low	qualifications	and	a	rising	age	profile)”	
(Becker	 et	 al	 2016:	 4).	 Goodwin	 and	 Heath	 (2016b)	 also	 focus	 on	 economic	 inequality,	
drawing	on	an	analysis	of	the	‘left	behind	thesis’.	Through	an	examination	of	both	individual	
and	 area-level	 data	 they	 find	 that	 “the	 poorest	 households,	 with	 incomes	 of	 less	 than	
£20,000	per	 year,	 as	well	 as	 the	 unemployed,	 low-skilled	 and	manual	workers,	 and	more	
broadly	 economically	 deprived	 groups	 vulnerable	 to	 poverty	were	more	 likely	 to	 support	
Brexit”	(Goodwin	and	Heath	2016c	online).	Studies	also	agree	that	education	was	a	strong	
predictor	(Goodwin	and	Heath	2016b;	Kaufmann	2016;	Becker	et	al	2016):	support	for	Brexit	
was	much	higher	 in	 areas	where	 large	numbers	 of	 people	do	not	 hold	 any	qualifications.	
Finally,	 another	 strong	 predictor	 was	 age,	 suggesting	 that-	 in	 line	 with	 the	 ‘left	 behind’	
thesis	 and	previous	 analyses	on	UKIP	 support-	 there	 is	 a	 link	between	 Leave	 support	 and	
societal	marginalization	especially	among	pensioners	and	older	voters.	Becker	et	al	(2016)	as	
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well	as	Goodwin	and	Heath	(2016)	also	find	a	link	between	support	for	Brexit	and	a	vote	for	
UKIP:	 ‘Public	 support	 for	 Leave	 closely	 mapped	 past	 support	 for	 UKIP	 but	 was	 more	
polarised	along	education	lines	than	support	for	UKIP’	(Goodwin	and	Heath	2016b:1).			
	
Our	findings	are	in	line	with	Becker	et	al’s	(2016)	argument	that	the	Brexit	vote	‘was	at	least	
partially	related	to	distributional	 issues’	 (Becker	et	al	2016:6)	and	that	there	 is	a	clear	 link	
between	Brexit	and	austerity:	‘just	a	slightly	less	harsh	regime	of	austerity	aimed	at	cutting	
benefits	 could	 have	 substantially	 reduced	 support	 for	 the	 Vote	 Leave	 campaign	 and	
overturned	the	result	of	the	EU	referendum’	(Becker	et	al	2016:	4).	This	is	also	in	line	with	
previous	work	that	examines	the	impact	of	economic	insecurity	on	far	right	party	support.	
Analyses	 focusing	 on	 the	 mediating	 role	 of	 welfare	 state	 institutions-	 for	 example	
unemployment	benefits	and	Employment	Protection	Legislation	(EPL)-	have	found	that	the	
far	right	is	more	likely	to	experience	an	increase	in	support	in	cases	where	these	institutions	
are	weak	and	do	not	contain	economic	insecurity	(Halikiopoulou	and	Vlandas	2016;	Vlandas	
and	Halikiopoulou	2016).	The	adoption	of	austerity	policies	that	increase	the	risks	and	costs	
of	unemployment	and	exacerbate	economic	 insecurity	 therefore	makes	 the	rise	of	 the	 far	
right	more	likely.		
	
In	 terms	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 immigration	 and	 the	 Brexit	 vote,	 findings	 are	more	
mixed.	 While	 Goodwin	 and	 Heath	 (2016c)	 did	 not	 find	 a	 positive	 relationship	 between	
support	 for	 Brexit	 and	 immigration	 levels,	 they	 did	 find	 a	 positive	 relationship	 between	
Brexit	 and	 change	 in	 immigration	 levels-	 in	 other	 words,	 in	 areas	 where	 the	 size	 of	 EU	
migrant	populations	increased	rapidly	were	more	likely	to	support	Brexit.	Areas,	therefore,	
“that	 had	 experienced	 a	 sudden	 influx	 of	 EU	migrants	 over	 the	 last	 10	 years	were	 often	
more	pro-leave”	(Goodwin	and	Heath	2016c).	This	coincides	somewhat	with	Becker	et	al’s	
(2016)	 finding	 that	 in	 terms	of	migration	 growth,	 only	migration	 from	 the	mainly	 Eastern	
European	EU	accession	countries	positively	correlates	with	the	Vote	Leave	share	(Becket	et	
al	2016:	23).	Beyond	this	however,	“relatively	little	variation	in	the	Vote	Leave	share	can	be	
explained	by	measures	of	a	local	authority	area’s	exposure	to	the	European	Union	(e.g.,	due	
to	immigration”	(2016:3).	But	immigration	wasn’t	the	key	driver	of	Brexit	according	to	this	
study.	Even	major	changes	in	immigration	would	have	been	unlikely	to	sway	the	vote.		The	
referendum	 result,	 they	 argue	 instead,	 “was	 driven	 by	 long-standing	 fundamental	
determinants,	most	 importantly	 those	 that	make	 it	 harder	 to	 deal	with	 the	 challenges	 of	
economic	and	social	change”	(Becket	et	2016:	13).		
	
Our	analysis	therefore,	as	well	as	other	initial	studies	on	Brexit,	point	to	the	importance	of	
the	economic	dimension.	The	more	 likely	Brexit	voters	are	the	 ‘left	behind’	 (Goodwin	and	
Heath	 2016)	 from	modernization	 and	 globalization,	 older,	 from	 poorer	 households,	 with	
lower	education	levels,	who	perceive	immigrants	as	a	threat	either	to	the	cultural	way	of	life	
or	their	economic	wellbeing	and	believe	they	are	competing	with	them	for	 jobs,	access	to	
social	 services	 and	more	 broadly	 the	 collective	 goods	 of	 the	 state.	 There	 is	 an	 additional	
dimension	to	this,	which	refers	to	attitudes	and	values.	The	key	to	this	is	sovereignty-based	
Euroscepticism,	 nationalism	 and	 conservative	 social	 values.	 There	 is	 a	 strong	 correlation	
between	voting	to	Leave	for	example	and	feeling	‘very	strongly’	English	(Goodwin	and	Heath	
2016c).	 Kaufmann	 (2016)	 also	 finds	 a	 correlation	 between	 Brexit	 support	 and	 socially	
conservative	 attitudes:	 those	 who	 support	 authoritarian	 positions	 such	 as	 harsh	 prison	
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sentences	 and	 the	 death	 penalty	 and	 oppose	 equal	 gender	 opportunities	 are	more	 likely	
Brexit	supporters.		
	
Conclusion	
	
This	chapter	has	focused	on	the	political	economy	of	the	Brexit	vote,	and	more	specifically,	
on	the	extent	to	which	economic	insecurity	played	a	role	in	the	vote	to	Leave	the	EU.	The	
link	between	 the	economy	and	Euroscepticism	 is	 often	 theorised	 in	 terms	of	 the	winners	
and	 losers	 of	 European	 integration.	 In	 other	 words,	 a	 vote	 against	 the	 EU	 is	 often	
understood	as	a	reaction	of	the	losers	of	integration.	We	theorise	this	in	terms	of	economic	
insecurity,	in	line	with	studies	that	have	attempted	to	test	the	effect	of	economic	insecurity	
on	 far	 right	 party	 support	 (Halikiopoulou	 and	 Vlandas	 2016;	 Vlandas	 and	 Halikiopoulou	
2016).		
	
Our	examination	of	BES	data	has	shown	that	labour	market	factors	have	a	profound	effect	
on	support	for	Brexit:	low	income	respondents	with	no	formal	education	and	in	low	skilled	
or	routine	occupations	that	are	at	risk	of	poverty	and	have	faced	the	brunt	of	immigration	
from	the	EU	are	especially	likely	to	support	Brexit.	Age	and	ethnicity	were	important,	while	
gender	did	not	 play	 a	 role.	 This	 confirms	 the	hypothesis	 that	 economic	 insecurity	was	 an	
important	driver	of	Brexit	and	 is	 in	 line	with	studies	 that	 find	that	 there	 is	a	 link	between	
austerity	policies	and	Brexit	support.				
	
Our	 findings	are	consistent	with	existing	 literature	on	Brexit	 to	date.	A	number	of	 studies	
since	the	UK	EU	referendum	has	found	similar	findings	relating	to	the	economy:	Becker	et	al	
(2016)	and	Goodwin	and	Heath	(2016a;	2016b;	2016c)	agree	that	the	left	behind,	older,	less	
educated	voters	in	manual	employment	are	more	likely	Brexit	supporters.	For	Becker	et	al	
(2016)	 this	 is	 because	 long-term	 conditions	 exacerbate	 one’s	 socio-economic	 standing,	
preventing	 opportunities.	 Austerity	 in	 the	 UK	 exacerbated	 the	 effect	 of	 economic	
deprivation,	thus	increasing	the	likelihood	of	a	Brexit	vote.		
	
We	 know,	 therefore,	 that	 the	 typical	 Brexit	 voter	 was	 more	 likely	 to	 be-	 but	 wasn’t	
exclusively-	 older,	 low	 skilled,	 in	 manual	 employment	 and	 socially	 and	 economically	
marginalised.	This	voter	could	have	previously	been	a	UKIP	supporter,	and	also	was	more	
likely	 to	 oppose	 immigration,	 feel	 strongly	 about	 his/her	 English	 identity	 and	 adopt	
conservative	 –	 even	 authoritarian-	 values	 about	 social	 issues.	 The	 question,	 to	 a	 great	
extent,	is	how	to	interpret	this	data.	Studies	differ	in	terms	of	which	factors	they	place	their	
emphasis	 on,	 suggesting	 these	 characteristics	 were	 important	 either	 because	 of	 the	
economic	 insecurities	 that	 these	 voters	 were	 facing	 per	 se,	 or	 because	 of	 a	 breach	 of	 a	
broader	 values	 consensus	 at	 the	 helm	 of	 which	 lies	 identity.	 In	 this	 latter	 view,	 socio-
economic	factors	in	themselves	are	less	important	than	attitudinal	factors.	Future	research	
could	 focus	more	on	the	causal	 links	and	determine	why	and	how	the	economic,	cultural,	
sovereignty-based	determinants	of	Euroscepticism	affect	voting	behaviour.		
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